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Grammar  of Predication 
In this article I will discuss the semantics of predication  in English and some of its 
implications  for syntax. Consider  (1): 
(1)  John is crazy. 
(1) says that John has (or instantiates)  a certain  property  (or state), the property  of being 
crazy. This, of course, is informative  only to the extent that we know what properties 
are and what operations  we can perform  on them (for example, under what conditions 
we can conjoin two properties or attribute  a property  to an individual).  Suppose it is 
possible to determine  the set of operations  we can perform  on properties  and to use the 
resulting  structure  in spelling  out the semantics  of predicative  constructions.  Presumably, 
there will be just a finite set of such allowable  operations.  Since there must exist some 
systematic relation between syntax and semantics, it follows that this will make pre- 
dictions about the behavior of predicative expressions. For example, it may set up a 
limited range of patterns that we should expect to find. Thus, a (semantic) theory of 
properties  might  be a significant  step toward  defining  what  a possible grammar  for natural 
languages  can be. 
I will argue that this is indeed so, by developing a semantic theory of properties 
and predication  that tries to be highly restrictive, '"perhaps  erring  in that direction," to 
borrow Williams's  words. The approach  I will develop is cast in the tradition  of logical 
semantics. I will sketch an axiomatic theory of properties  and its model-theoretic  in- 
terpretation.  I will then show how this theory, embedded  in an independently  motivated 
theory of syntax, explains significant  aspects of the way nominal  and verbal  predicative 
structures  behave in English. 
A few terminological  preliminaries  are in order. By property  (or propositional  func- 
tion) I will refer to whatever Verb Phrases (as they occur in sentences like (1)) are 
semantically  associated with. The main characteristic  of properties  can be taken to be 
that  they can be meaningfully  attributed  to (or saturated  by) a subject  (or, more  neutrally, 
an argument).' In this regard properties differ crucially from other popular semantic 
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creatures. Take individuals-for  instance, the semantic  values of simple Noun Phrases 
like Pavarotti. The bearer  of this name, besides being a well-known  tenor, is a saturated 
particular;  he cannot take an argument.  We cannot attribute  individuals  to other indi- 
viduals like we can attribute  properties  to individuals.  Consider  next the semantic  value 
of overtly clausal constructions (such as (1)), namely propositions. Propositions  result 
when a property is saturated  by (applied to/predicated  of) an individual  in an act of 
predication. They share with individuals the fact that they are saturated structures 
(which, of course, does not imply that propositions  are individuals).  Various semantic 
theories  of propositions  exist. For instance, it has been proposed  that  such entities should 
be construed  as sets of possible worlds, or as sets of situations,  or as events, etc. Some 
approaches take the notion of proposition as primitive and provide an axiomatic (or 
algebraic)  characterization  of their structure.  In what follows, I will focus on the nature 
of properties,  while remaining  neutral  about the nature  of propositions.  Readers should 
feel free to fill in their favorite views concerning  the semantic  value of Ss. 
1. The Problem 
It can be argued  that as speakers of natural  languages  we do not use properties  just to 
predicate  something  of an individual  (as in (1)). We also refer  to them and attribute  other 
properties  to them. We may even attribute  properties  to themselves. Consider, for ex- 
ample, the following sentences. 
(2) a.  Wisdom is hard to find. 
b.  The property  of being wise is hard  to find. 
fBeing wise  . 
C.  To be wise  is crazy. 
d.  Wearing  black ties is a passing fad. 
e.  Being crazy is crazy. 
(2a) contains  a morphological  nominalization  and (2b)  a gerund  headed  by the noun  prop- 
erty. Such examples clearly suggest that the domain of individuals  we refer to must 
contain a way of representing  property-like  creatures. However, the nature of nomin- 
alizations such as those in (2a-b) is still largely unknown, which relegates our consid- 
erations to the realm of intuitions. I believe that a more compelling  point concerning 
the fact that properties can also be arguments  of other properties (and, possibly, ar- 
guments of themselves) can be made in connection with (2c-e).  To a certain degree, 
such a point will be theory dependent, for theories differ significantly  with regard  to 
analyzing  infinitives and gerunds. Four major  current  hypotheses can be distinguished 
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(3)  Hypothesis  Syntax  Semantics  Framework 
I  nonclausal  nonpropositional  Classical Montague 
(VPs)  (properties)  Grammar  (MG) 
II  clausal  nonpropositional  Williams's  predication 
(S's)  (properties)  theory 
III  nonclausal  propositional  Lexical Functional  Grammar 
(LFG) 
IV  clausal  propositional  Government-Binding  Theory 
(GB) 
If hypothesis III or IV is correct, it is not clear that properties  can be arguments  of other 
properties;  but if I or II is correct, they obviously can. Thus, I and II seem to call for 
a semantic  framework  that allows for properties  to saturate  argument  positions of other 
properties  (including,  possibly, their own argument  positions, as in (2e)). Our task will 
be to develop such a framework. Though various proposals have been made toward 
developing approaches  with the characteristics  just sketched (especially within the tra- 
dition of philosophical  logic; see section 1.2), the systematic study of the consequences 
that different  property  theories have for natural  language  semantics has barely begun. 
In what follows I will adopt hypothesis I. In section 2.1 1 will propose a theory of 
properties  and predication  that accomplishes  what hypothesis I seems to call for. I will 
then show how to implement such an approach  within a theory of grammar  that can 
perhaps best be described as base-generated  syntax plus compositional  semantics. Fi- 
nally, in sections 3 and 4 I will discuss some empirical  consequences of this semantics 
and compare  it with other approaches  (especially the Government-Binding  framework). 
1.1.  The Control  Issue 
Within  the limits of this article there is no way to do justice to the criticisms  that have 
been leveled against  hypothesis I (see, for example, Koster and May (1982)).  However, 
I would like to discuss briefly the problem  of control. If infinitives  have no "'subjects" 
either in the syntax or in the semantics, why are they usually understood  as if they had 
one? Hypothesis I offers no obvious answer to this question, and potentially  this con- 
stitutes an obstacle to bearing  with what follows. Without  any pretense of exhaustive- 
ness, then, I would like to recall some of the strategies that have been developed to 
handle control phenomena  within hypothesis I. 
One possibility is to build into the interpretive  procedure  a device that inserts the 
missing subjects in the semantics. For example, although  infinitives  like to leave denote 
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would end up having something  like wish' (leave'(j))(j) as its meaning.  Infinitives  would 
get their subjects by a semantic rule. This view is defended in detail in (for example) 
Klein and Sag (1982). 
A second possibility is to regard  control as a matter  of semantic entailments.  Ac- 
cording to this view, something  like wish is semantically  a relation  between properties 
and individuals. Thus, for example, John wishes to leave says that the wish-relation 
holds between John and leaving, and its meaning  (its truth-conditional  import)  can be 
represented as wish'(leave')(j). However, when such a relation holds, it must also be 
the case that in all the situations  where what John wishes is the case (i.e. in the worlds 
of John's desires) John, in fact, leaves. Our  intuition  that there is an understood  subject 
in control structures  is simply based on the circumstance  that by knowing the lexical 
meaning of an item, we also know the entailments  associated with it. If we know the 
meaning of '+'  (i.e.  addition),  we must know that for every a and every  b, a  +  b  =  b 
+  a. If we know what wish means, we must know that for every a and every property 
P,  if a wishes P,  then a wishes to bring P(a) about. Entailments  of this sort can be 
captured in various ways, for example, by meaning  postulates schemata. This second 
view has been defended in (for example) Thomason (1976), Dowty (1982b), Chierchia 
(1983; 1984).2 
Deciding among competing theories of control is an empirical  issue, and our se- 
mantics of predication  will certainly  be affected by (and perhaps, indirectly,  affect) the 
outcome of the debate on control-related  phenomena.  For present purposes, however, 
it is only necessary to keep in mind  that various  theories of control  based on hypothesis 
I have been developed in detail  and  have been motivated  on grounds  largely  or completely 
independent  of the facts we will consider below. 
1.2.  Semantic  Perspectives  on Properties  and Predication 
Hypothesis I seems to call for a theory where properties can be arguments  of other 
properties, including, possibly, themselves. Since Russell's paradox, we know that to 
construct domains with these characteristics  is not a straightforward  matter.  Within  the 
tradition  of philosophical  logic, three families of approaches  to this problem  have been 
developed, which I will illustrate  on the basis of (4a-b) (=  (1), (2c)). 
(4) a.  John is crazy. 
b.  Being wise is crazy. 
The first approach  is based on Russell's theory of types and is still the one most 
generally adopted within standard  Montague  Grammar.  According to this view, prop- 
erties are ranked  on the basis of the arguments  they can take. In (4a), then, is crazy is 
a property of individuals, but in (4b) it would have to be associated with a different 
property  of a higher  type that can take properties  (of the first level) as arguments;  and 
2 Chierchia  (1984)  represents  an attempt  to integrate  a semantic  approach  to control  based on meaning 
postulates  with a theory of (syntactic)  predication  based on that of Williams  (1980). FORMAL  SEMANTICS  AND  THE  GRAMMAR  OF  PREDICATION  421 
so on. There are several problems  with this view. Syntactically,  the two VPs in (4a-b) 
appear to be identical. Yet type theory postulates a semantic distinction-one  that is 
not signaled in any way in either the syntax or the morphology.  This does not seem to 
be an accident of English. To the best of my knowledge, no systematic correlation  of 
type-theoretic  hierarchies  with overt syntactic  markings  has been found  in any language. 
If type-theoretic hierarchies  are real, isn't it strange that they should go unmarked  in 
language  after language?  Furthermore,  although  type theory allows properties  to apply 
to other properties, this makes it hard, if not impossible, to model what looks like self- 
attribution  of properties.  Indeed, I believe that a fairly strong  case can be made against 
attempts to base a semantics for predication  on the classical theory of types (such as 
the one adopted by Montague).  However, I will not pursue this here.3 
A second approach  is to construct  a first-order  theory  of properties  (see for example 
Bealer (1982)). In such a theory, properties  are primitives,  and a predication  (or instan- 
tiation) relation, say 'A', connects properties  to (genuine)  individuals.  Thus, John runs 
is represented as  jA  run' (John instantiates the property of running).  Paradoxes are 
eliminated  by regimenting  the "logic" of 'A' via a set of axioms. Typically,  these axioms 
will look like those of set theory, minus, of course, extensionality.  That is, unlike sets, 
two properties  can have the same instances without being identical. 
A third  approach  goes back to Frege's view that properties  can be said to have two 
modes of being. When they occur in predicate  position (like is crazy in (4a)), they are 
intrinsically  functional, "gapped," or unsaturated  structures  (perhaps  cognitive capaci- 
ties of some sort). However, these structures  are systematically  correlated  with indi- 
viduals. For example, is wise is semantically  associated with an unsaturated  structure 
that  can be taken  to have a certain  state, the state of being  wise, as its individual  correlate. 
When we say something  about properties,  we really purport  to refer to their individual 
correlates. Thus, the basic feature  of this view is that propositional  functions (i.e. prop- 
erties in their predicative  role) strictly speaking  never apply to themselves but only to 
their individual  images. Until quite recently there was a serious problem  with this view, 
namely that as originally  formulated  by Frege it was inconsistent (because subject to 
Russell's paradox).  However, ways have been found  of making  it work. In the following 
section I will briefly describe one solution (drawing  from work by N. B. Cocchiarella). 
This third approach  is the one I will defend, by arguing  that it explains the behavior of 
English predicative  expressions in a way other approaches  cannot. 
2.  The Framework 
In this section I will sketch the assumptions  within which an arguably  optimal solution 
to the problem  discussed above can be achieved. First, I will outline a semantic  theory 
of properties  and predication  inspired  by Frege's view (familiarity  with the basic notions 
3 Parsons (1979)  and Cresswell (1973)  represent  the most extensive developments  of Montague's  type- 
theoretic approach.  Detailed discussion and criticism  of those views can be found in Chierchia  (1982; 1984) 
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of Montague  semantics  will be assumed).  Then I will construe  the theory as an empirical 
theory of meaning, by relating  it in a principled  way to syntax. 
2.1.  Semantics 
In order to make a Fregean theory of predication  precise, it is necessary to identify a 
mechanism  with known formal properties  that can accommodate  the intuitive content 
of such a theory. To this end, consider standard  second-order  logic. Besides individual 
and predicative constants, such a logic includes individual variables (xI,  x2,  .  ..) 
(n-place) predicative variables (Pn,  p,  .  .  .),  and the standard  connectives and quan- 
tifiers, the latter being allowed to bind predicative  variables  as well as individual  ones. 
The formation  rule for atomic formulae  is the following: 
(5)  If gB  is an n-place  predicative  expression  and al,  .  .  .a,  a,  are singular terms, 
then 1(o i)  .  .  . (a,,) is an atomic well-formed  formula.  (Here and throughout  I 
use a Montague-style  notation  for relations.) 
Now, the singular  terms of standard  second-order  logic are just individual  variables  or 
individual  constants. To the usual formation  rules, we will add a new one that allows 
us to derive complex singular  terms  from predicative  expressions, along the following 
lines: 
(6)  If ,B  is an n-place predicative  expression, '3  is a singular  term. 
For self-evident reasons, predicative  expressions preceded by '^' will be called nomi- 
nalized predicative expressions. Under the standard  assumption  that well-formed  for- 
mulas (i.e. sentences) really are 0-place predicative  expressions, rule (6) will allow us 
to nominalize  them as well. (7) contains examples of well-formed  formulas  of the formal 
system so obtained: 
(7) a.  3P[P(7P)] 
b.  R(Q)(x) 
c.  believe'([Q(x)])(j) 
As shown in Cocchiarella  (1978; 1979),  a variety of systems obtained  by adding  (6) (or 
something  equivalent)  to second-order  logic are consistent  relative  to (Zermelo-Fraenkel) 
set theory. In fact, modifying the comprehension  principle of standard  second-order 
logic in various ways results in different  logics for nominalized  predicates that can be 
said to reflect different  philosophical  positions  on the nature  of universals.4  Furthermore, 
these systems can be augmented by standard  tense and modal operators and by the 
X-abstractor. 
The trademark  of the logics just described is that properties  are projected in two 
distinct logical roles: as predicates and as singular  terms. These roles can be taken to 
4For  discussion, see for example Cocchiarella  (1979).  The system adopted  in Chierchia  (1984)  is Coc- 
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represent  the forms or modes of being that characterize  properties  from a Fregean  point 
of view. This can perhaps  be seen more  clearly  by considering  the model-theoretic  frames 
with respect to which standard  metatheoretical  results (such as consistency and com- 
pleteness) are obtainable. Such frames can be informally  described  as follows: 
(8)  Propositional  Fregean  frames: (U, Xn, W, J<, f)nEw 
In intuitive terms: U is the domain of individuals.  Xo is an algebra  of proposition. For 
n > 0, Xn is the domain  of n-place  relations  (propositional  functions).  An n-place  propo- 
sitional  function  is represented  as in the work of Schonfinkel  and  Montague  as a function 
from U into an n -  1 relation.  In particular,  a 1-place  propositional  function  (a property) 
will be a function from individuals  into propositions (wha-tever  the latter are taken to 
be). JS is the set of times. W is the set of worlds, possibly viewed as (time-indexed) 
sets of propositions  (functions  in {O, }X  xJ). f  is a map from U  Xn into U. Intuitively, 
nEw 
f  is what provides an individual  image for each propositional  function and is used to 
give the semantics of the nominalization  operator  '"'.  For example: Let Q be a 1-place 
predicative  constant and let I  I be the interpretation  function. [Q]  will be a member  of 
pu and for any u( U, IQJ(u)  will be a proposition  (i.e. a member  of P). [Ql(u) is true at 
a world w and a time  j iff w( QJ(u),  j)  =  1. Furthermore,  fJQI  = f( QD);  that  is, syntactic 
nominalizations  correspond  to a semantic operation  that takes a propositional  function 
to its individual  correlate. 
This example should help clarify the sense in which the model-theoretic  frame in 
(8), besides being a technical tool for testing fundamental  metatheoretical  properties  of 
our  theory, also provides  a precise heuristic  into what  its "intended"  interpretation  might 
be taken  to be. The theory  just sketched  (via its axioms  and  models)  answers  the following 
questions, among others. Given two properties  P, Q, is there the property  of being both 
P and Q? (Yes.) Given a 2-place relation R, is there the property of standing in the 
relation  R to someone? (Yes.) Is there a property  that something  has  just in case it cannot 
apply to itself? (No.) Thus, such a theory characterizes  what we can do with properties 
in the same way, for example, a theory of numbers  (e.g. Peano's) specifies what we can 
do with numbers. 
Before implementing  this system in a grammar,  we must address  another  issue. The 
logic thus far described  is conceived as a second-order  (modal)  theory of properties  and 
should provide a framework  within which to do semantics. However, certain consid- 
erations suggest that such a framework  might still be inadequate  for that purpose. In 
the logic sketched  above, everything  is either  a property  or an individual.  But presumably 
we would not want to claim that every expression in a natural  language  should be ana- 
lyzed either as an individual  or as a property  of some sort. In particular,  I do not think 
we want to analyze adverbs  or prepositions  as properties  (although  in principle  we could; 
see Chierchia  (1982)). To see this, imagine  that any predicative  expression of our logic 
can be nominalized. But adverbs, prepositions, determiners,  etc., obviously cannot be 
nominalized  in the sense in which predicates  can. This would follow, if we assume that 
they are not properties  and thus do not fall within  the domain  of the Fregean  correlation 424  GENNARO  CHIERCHIA 
function. It is easy enough to accomplish  this, by modeling  adverbs, etc., as third-order 
functional constants (i.e. functions defined over properties)  of our logic. Adding the 
latter  to the formal  system described  above is completely straightforward.  For example, 
adverbs like slowly would be represented  as functions from 1-place  propositional  func- 
tions into 1-place  propositional  functions. Prepositions  in their  adverbial  uses (John runs 
in the park) would be functions  from NP-type meanings  into adverb-type  meanings,  and 
so on. The way of modeling  these entities is the one familiar  from standard  Montague 
Grammar.  The functions that accomplish  this (being of a higher  order than properties) 
cannot be nominalized.  It is important  to note in this connection that to model nonpre- 
dicative categories (like adverbs or prepositions)  we seem to need nothing  higher than 
third-order  functions. In Montague's  system, properties  do not have individual  images. 
This was presumably  one of the reasons for wanting  to build the entire type-theoretic 
hierarchy  into semantics, for each reference  to a property  P of type n seemed to require 
resorting  to a property of Q of a higher type (and so on, up the ladder of types). The 
imaging  of properties  in the domain  of individuals  allows us to do away with this infinite 
type-theoretic  progression,  while preserving  the type-theoretic  distinctions  we (arguably) 
need. 
The logic just described  can be implemented  as a type theory of the following sort. 
Let e and p be our basic types. Individual  expressions will be of type e and take their 
values in U. Well-formed  formulas  will be of type p and take their values in P. We then 
say that if b is a type and a  =  e or a  =  (en,p)  (where  (en,p)  =  (e,  .  .  . (e,p)  . .. 
n-times 
then (a,b) is also a type. This recursive schema will generate types like ((e,p), (e,p)) 
(i.e. functions  from 1-place  propositional  functions  into 1-place  propositional  functions), 
but not types like ((p,p),e) or (((e,p),p),p) (where the latter  would correspond  to a func- 
tion that maps second-order  functions  into propositions).  We assume that our logic con- 
tains denumerably  many constants and variables  of type e and (en,p)  and denumerably 
many constants of other types. 
The resulting  system, which I call IL*, has various  features in common with Mon- 
tague's Intensional  Logic (IL), but differs  from it in type-theoretic  structure.  The type- 
theoretic structure  of IL* is much more constrained  and simple. Instead of the infinite 
layers of types of IL, IL* has only three layers of types (or semantic categories): in- 
dividuals  (e), propositional  functions  ((en,p  ), and  third-order  functors  (e.g. ((e,p), (e,p))). 
In addition, it has the Fregean nominalization  device. Note, moreover, that quantifica- 
tional reference to third-order  entities (e.g. functions of type ((e,p),p)) is disallowed 
in IL,.  If our goal is to model adverbs and the like, the minimal  addition needed to 
our basic theory of properties is  simply a number of constants. Thus, the resulting 
system is still to be regarded as a (nonstandard)  second-order  logic with modalities 
and X-abstraction.  This similarity in  structure to  Montague's IL will enable us  to 
inherit in a straightforward  way the results achieved within that framework, as will 
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2.2  Syntax 
I will assume here, following Montague (1974), that syntax and semantics are related 
by a homomorphism;  that is, that semantics takes the form of a compositional  inter- 
pretation procedure on surface syntactic structures. Though controversial, this claim 
represents the most restrictive hypothesis on the relation  between syntax and (model- 
theoretic) semantics that I know of.5 
Mostly for the sake of execution, our discussion will be couched in categorial  rather 
than phrase-structural  terms. Therefore, we will assume that there exists a small pool 
of primitive  ("nonfunctional")  syntactic categories, out of which all other categories  are 
recursively defined. Derived ("functional")  categories are taken to have the form A/B 
or A//B. An item of category A/B (or A//B) is something  that combines with a B to give 
an A. The mode of combination  need not be simple concatenation  (although  this can be 
taken  to be the unmarked  choice in configurational  languages  like English).  The following 
is a sample categorial  base for English: 
(9) a.  Basic categories: NP, S6 
b.  VP  =  S/NP 
c.  TVP (transitive  verb phrases) =  VP/NP 
d.  try-type  verbs: VP/VP 
e.  ADV (adverb  phrases) =  VP//VP etc. 
A categorial base of just this sort has been defended on various grounds  by a number 
of authors (e.g. Bach (1980), Keenan and Faltz (1978))  and forms the base of what has 
come to be known as the categorial theory  of grammatical  relations  (Dowty (1982a,b)). 
Compositionality  is built into the framework  in two steps. First, it is assumed that 
each syntactic category is associated with exactly one semantic  type. Second, for each 
syntactic rule there will be exactly one semantic  rule (which  is what Bach calls the Rule- 
by-Rule Hypothesis). The actual implementation  of compositionality  is governed by 
(some version of) Partee's (1979) Well-formedness  Constraint-that  is, an evaluation 
metric that ranks as marked  "abstract" syntactic structures  (or rules). 
Clearly this proposal would still leave too much freedom to language-particular 
grammars,  for each language  would be free to stipulate  its own assignment  of semantic 
types to syntactic categories or its own pairing  of syntactic rules with semantic ones. 
Montague's original proposal, however, can be tightened significantly  in fairly simple 
and reasonable ways, and much work in the Montague  tradition  has been devoted to 
such a goal. As one example, let us consider in more detail the particular  form of com- 
positionality I would like to assume, drawing  from several recent proposals. 
5 The current  state of the debate  on compositionality  is discussed  in Partee  (1983).  See also the references 
there. 
6  NP corresponds  to Montague's  T, S to Montague's  t, and VP to Montague's  IV. For simplicity  I will 
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Let us focus first on the category-type  correspondence.  Our  goal is to narrow  down 
the number  of logically conceivable ways in which a language  can pair  its own categorial 
base with semantic types. A fairly simple principle  that Montague  (1974)  adopted (even 
though he did not state it explicitly) is the following: 
(10)  Functional  Correspondence 
A lexical item a-  is syntactically  a function  (belongs  to a syntactic category of 
the form A/B) iff it is semantically  a function (that is, its meaning  is of type 
(a,b)). 
It is evident that (10) significantly  constrains  the number  of possible category-type  map- 
pings. For instance, Bennett's type assignment  (Dowty, Wall, and Peters (1981, 188ff.)) 
is ruled  out by (10). Essentially, by virtue  of (10), all nonfunctional  (primitive)  categories 
will have to be mapped  into types that are not of the form (a,b), and there are only two 
such types in our theory: e and p. Furthermore,  it seems natural  to stipulate  that S is 
the only universally primitive category that must be mapped  into p. We are then left 
with e as the only type into which all other primitive  categories  will have to be mapped. 
Thus, the nonfunctional  categories will have to be "nominal" in the sense that their 
meanings will have to be logically classified as individuals  of some sort (i.e. nonfunc- 
tions).7 
What about functional (derived) categories? Clearly in these cases we want some 
way of recursively specifying  the type of a functional  category  by mirroring  the way the 
category itself is built up. Now functional  categories are of the form A/B or A//B. This 
notation  is Montague's,  but I shall  use it in a different  way, where  the difference  is really 
dictated by the semantics I am proposing. This semantics distinguishes  propositional 
functions (which are nominalizable)  from higher-order  functors (modifiers, which are 
not nominalizable).  In general, we would expect universal semantic distinctions to be 
encoded in the syntax with some systematicity. Thus, in particular,  we expect to find 
(at least) two classes of functions in the syntax: those that correspond  to propositional 
functions (which we will denote as A/B's) and those that correspond  to functors (which 
we will denote as A//B's). This hypothesis can be made explicit in a type-assignment 
schema that uses a simple recursion  like this: 
(11)  T(A) =  the type corresponding  to A 
a.  T(A/B)  =  (e,  T(A)) 
b.  T(AI/B) =  (T(B), T(A)) 
(1  lb) simply  says that  an element  of category  A//B will be associated  with a function  from 
things of the type corresponding  to B's to things of the type corresponding  to A's. This 
will not do, in general, for elements of a category A/B, for we have stipulated  that such 
categories correspond to propositional  functions. Propositional  functions are, by defi- 
7 Of course, they might  be "abstract"  individuals  of various  sorts. For a more  detailed  consideration  of 
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nition, functions from individuals  into propositions. Hence, the semantic type of the 
argument  in a category of the form A/B can only be e, viz., the type of individuals.  In 
other words, the single vs. double slash notation can be viewed as a semantically  mo- 
tivated syntactic feature. It says that syntactic categories form two natural  classes ac- 
cording  to the kind of semantic  functions  they are associated with. A/B's and A//B's are 
expected to behave differently  with respect to a number  of grammatical  processes, such 
as nominalization.  Some such processes will be discussed in sections 3-5. 
From these considerations we can conclude, then, that Universal Grammar  em- 
bodies a principle, Functional  Correspondence,  that allows a simple, compositional  im- 
plementation  of our semantics in a categorial  grammar.  Among other things, such an 
implementation  allows possible category-type assignments to be restricted to the fol- 
lowing: all primitive  categories (except S) must be mapped  into e; the type of derived 
categories is determined  by the type of the input categories via the schema in (11). For 
the English sample, we thus have: 
(12) a.  T(S)  =  p,  T(NP) =  e 
b.  T(VP) =  T(S/NP) =  (e,  T(S))  =  (e,  p) 
c.  T(TVP) =  T(VP/NP) =  (e,  T(VP))  =  (e,  (e,  p))(=  (e2,  p)) 
d.  T(VP/VP)  =  (e,  T(VP))  =  (e,  (e, p))(=  (e2,  p)) 
e.  T(VP//VP) =  (T(VP), T(VP)) =  ((e, p),  (e,  p)) 
Thus, the unmarked  semantic make-up  of items of various  categories can be said to be 
fully determined  by fairly general  principles  of Universal  Grammar,  such as Functional 
Correspondence. 
Similar considerations apply to the way syntactic rules are associated with their 
semantic counterparts.  In particular,  I will assume that there are only two unmarked 
syntactic-semantic  rule pairs. The syntax will include rules of binding  and rules of cate- 
gorial cancellation. Binding rules are essentially taken to be Cooper-storage  devices 
(Cooper  (1983)).  In what follows, I will not discuss binding  rules  at all, and I will proceed 
as though all NPs were simple referential  NPs. I do so purely for expository purposes, 
and nothing  that I will say hinges upon it. The format  of categorial  cancellation  rules is 
given in (13a), and an example in (13b): 
(13) a.  If ,3 (  PA/B and aL E PA,  Affix,(ot  a,)  E PA 
b.  If ,B E Pvp, and a  E PNP, RCONCATENATE  (ot,)  E Ps 
Affixj(a,4)  is taken to be the only syntactic operation of core grammar  (to be read 
"Affix a  after the nth constituent of I").  The parameter  n and the level of constitu- 
enthood that Affix,(a4,3)  has access to are severely restricted  by an independent  set of 
principles determining  how such parameters  may covary with a particular  categorial 
base, the configurational  characteristics  of the language,  etc.8 Right concatenation  and 
Bach's "Rightwrap"  ("Affix a after the head of  3")  are the only instances of the core 
operation that have been argued  to be active in the grammar  of English. 
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The semantic  rules that correspond  to (syntactic)  binding  and categorial  cancellation 
are X-Abstraction  and Functional  Application, respectively. As usual, we assume that 
semantics takes the form of a set of rules of translation  into a logical language (here, 
IL*). Since the model-theoretic  interpretation  of such a language  is a well-defined  and 
well-known  entity, such translations  can be said  to specify  the truth  conditions  associated 
with sentences of English. The general  format  of Functional  Application  is this: 
(14)  If P (  PA/B  translates as f'  and ot EPA  translates as  t',  then Affix,(a,) 
translates  as 1'(o'). 
Thus, the picture emerges of a set of interrelated  syntactic  and semantic  categories and 
rules that generate and interpret  in tandem  the well-formed  expressions of a language. 
In the same spirit as many current  lexicalist approaches,  this framework  encodes 
a substantial amount of information  in the lexicon rather than, say, in tree-theoretic 
notions. The strong  form of compositionality  adopted  here limits in a principled  fashion 
the range  of choices available  to language-particular  grammars.  Modulo  the selection of 
a particular  categorial  base (and some honest housekeeping),  the syntax and semantics 
of an item can be basically read off its syntactic category. Thus, to exemplify further, 
a language-learning  device confronted  with a set of data must choose a particular  cate- 
gorial base from a narrowly  circumscribed  inventory. Then a number  of crucial prop- 
erties of the grammar  (how items of different  categories  differ  in meaning,  what syntactic 
and semantic rules the grammar  includes, etc.) will follow automatically,  thanks to a 
very strict compositional  characterization  of the syntax-semantics  interface. Borrowing 
a different  theoretical  vocabulary,  one could say that compositionality,  as characterized 
above, enables us to deduce a number  of important  features  of language-particular  gram- 
mars from the subcategorization  properties  of lexical items. In this sense, composition- 
ality would subsume significant  effects of what in the GB framework  is handled  in terms 
of (various  forms of) the Projection  Principle. 
3.  Some Consequences 
In this section I will consider some empirical  consequences of the semantic theory of 
properties  developed earlier.  The general  line I will take is based  on a simple  observation. 
If the semantic distinctions (individuals  vs. propositional  functions vs. functors) made 
above are real, they ought to play a crucial role in explaining  the behavior of a wide 
range of constructions. More precisely, we should be able to find empirical  patterns 
whose characteristics  can be deduced  from the characteristics  of the semantics  we have 
been developing. As we will see, some of the empirical  consequences of this semantics 
for predication  do not depend on the particular  view of the syntax-semantics  relation 
presented  in section 2.2. These weakly theory-bound  consequences  are also more specu- 
lative. Other, more solid empirical  consequences of the semantics seem to depend on 
a compositional  view of the syntax-semantics  mapping,  such as the one sketched in the 
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unrelated  properties of English predicative  constructions  can be derived from the pro- 
posed theory of properties  construed as the semantic component  of a grammar. 
First, let us consider what I believe can be regarded  as weakly theory-bound  evi- 
dence for the proposed theory. Recall the following properties  of IL*: 
(15) a.  IL* has expressions of three logical types. 
b.  IL* does not have variable-binding  mechanisms  for (third-order)  functors. 
Now,  if we adopt IL* as our semantics, (iSa-b)  become claims concerning possible 
grammatical  processes. In particular,  (iSa) entails that every expression  of every natural 
language  must belong to one of three semantic  categories and that if something  is clas- 
sified as a predicate, it ought to be nominalizable,  whereas if it is classified as a functor, 
it ought not to be nominalizable  (the Three-Layers  Hypothesis).9  Furthermore,  there is 
general  agreement  on the fact that to deal with anaphoric  dependencies,  variable-binding 
mechanisms  of some sort are required.  Thus, (lSb) entails  that there  can be no anaphoric 
phenomenon  that involves functors  (the Functor  Anaphora  Constraint).  Of course, these 
constraints  are not absolute. For example, one could extend IL* to accommodate,  say, 
fourth-order  functors. However, these extensions will involve stipulations  beyond those 
made so far, which in an obvious sense gives them a marked  status. As usual, then, any 
constraint  built into IL* is to be viewed not as a once-and-for-all  prohibition  but as a 
contribution  to a theory of markedness. 
Let us now consider evidence bearing  on these two constraints. 
3.1.  The Three-Layers Hypothesis 
The fact that adverbs, prepositions, determiners,  and complementizers  do not undergo 
nominalization  processes in any way comparable  to those that verbs (or adjectives) 
undergo  was part  of the original  motivation  for building  a three-leveled  semantic  system. 
Is there any independent  evidence that might support  it? The following considerations 
suggest that there is. 
The argument  structure  of a predicate  can be manipulated  in a number  of ways. For 
example,  arguments  can  be  deleted  (I  ate  the  cake  -  I ate)  or added  (I  walked  -  I 
walked  the dog). Semantically,  these argument-manipulating  operations  can be naturally 
construed as (third-order)  predicate modifiers  that map predicates into predicates. So, 
for instance, there might  be a functor  CA  USE that maps 1-place  propositional  functions 
into 2-place ones, defined roughly  as follows: 
(16) a.  CAUSE = df XP Xx Xy[y brings  about  P(x)]'0 
b.  CAUSE(walk')(x)(y) =  y brings  about that x walks 
9 Jespersen (1924, chap. VII) claims that syntactic categories  can be grouped  in three natural  classes: 
primary  (NP-like  things), secondary  (predicate-like  things),  and tertiary  (everything  else). I think  that this is, 
in essence, the Three-Layers  Hypothesis. 
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Adverbs are treated as 1-place  functors that map properties  into properties.  Thus, not 
only can a function like CAUSE not apply to adverbs-there  actually  can be no functor 
CAUSE* that "causativizes" adverbs. Such a functor would have to take adverbs as 
arguments,  which would make it a fourth-order  functor. But that is beyond IL*'s limits. 
Hence, IL* predicts  that there can be no analogue  of causativization  (or argument  drop, 
passive, etc.) for adverbs (or determiners,  prepositions,  etc.). Note that within either a 
system like Montague's  IL or a first-order  theory of properties,  to define something  like 
CAUSE* presents no problem. In a fully typed system, there will obviously be fourth- 
(or higher)  order  functions. This holds also for a first-order  system, since such a system 
essentially pushes the whole type-theoretic  hierarchy  back down in the domain of in- 
dividuals. 
There are items that appear  to modify  functors.  Modifiers  of functors  (e.g. modifiers 
of adverbs) would have to be construed  as fourth-  (or higher)  order  functors  (since they 
take third-level  entities as arguments)  and hence might  present  a problem.  Only  is a good 
example (as in John only eats slowly, where slowly  is focused). What  does IL* say about 
those? To answer this, let us consider other operators  that do not fit the three-layered 
mold of our logic-for  example, and. Clearly, and has special properties:  it is cross- 
categorial, and it has a "universal" semantic content. These characteristics  indepen- 
dently require  that and be treated  as a logical  operator,  that  is, mapped  into a generalized 
meet operator of some sort.'1 Because of the universal semantic content of and, this 
move is without cost, for we can assume that such an operator  is provided  by Universal 
Grammar  (i.e.  by a possibly innate capacity for concept formation). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect that if a function does not fit neatly in any of our three semantic 
categories, either it should have characteristics  similar  to those of and, or it is marked. 
Clearly, items like only do have the expected characteristics  (that is, cross-categoricity 
and universal semantic content) and are therefore  well-behaved  in this regard.12 
Thus, the Three-Layers  Hypothesis makes  at least two very general  predictions  that 
are independent of any nominalization  phenomena:  namely, that there can be no op- 
erations like passivization or causativization  for functors (e.g. adverbs) and that mod- 
ifiers of functors should have certain characteristics.  Preliminary  consideration  of the 
available evidence suggests that these predictions  are borne out. 
3.2.  The Functor Anaphora Constraint 
The existence of anaphoric phenomena that involve predicates as such (i.e.  in their 
predicative role) is well attested. One anaphora  and VP deletion are good examples in 
English. Consider: 
(17)  Ezio likes every book about Pavarotti, while Nando only likes this one. 
(18)  Ezio hates Pavarotti and Nando does too. 
" For discussion, see Rooth and Partee  (1983)  (and references  therein).  12 A detailed discussion of the syntax and semantics  of only and related  items can be found in Rooth 
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Phenomena  like VP deletion (within semantically  oriented approaches)  have been ana- 
lyzed as processes that amount  to binding  a predicate  variable  to an antecedent.13  I know 
of no process analogous to VP deletion for adverbs, prepositions, and the like. For 
example, as far as I know, no language displays anaphoric  dependencies like the fol- 
lowing: 
(19)  John runs in the park and Mary runs  pro the gym. 
This is just what we would expect on the basis of IL*. These processes are expected 
to be highly marked  since their semantics  clearly involves a variable-binding  mechanism 
for functors. 
Of course, adverbs are good candidates as an easy counterexample  to this claim, 
for they clearly enter anaphoric  relations  of various sorts. For example, in English  they 
can be wh-moved. Wh  Movement  must be cast as a binding  rule  whose semantics  would 
seem to involve quantification  (X-abstraction)  over functors, in our terminology.  There- 
fore, perhaps  the Functor  Anaphora  Constraint  will have  to be weakened.  However, since 
trying to maintain  the most restrictive available hypothesis has proven to be a useful 
research strategy, let us ask first how we might keep it as it is. Essentially, we would 
have to claim that all anaphoric  dependencies involving  adverbs  are really instances of 
predicate anaphora  in disguise. To see what this could mean (and whether it is viable), 
let us consider an example. 
English how-questions  are a clear instance of Wh  Movement  of adverbs. To make 
the point, we need a clear hypothesis on the semantics of questions. For the sake of 
exposition, I will adopt Karttunen's  (1977), although  I believe that the same point could 
be made with respect to other approaches. In simplified  terms, Karttunen  claims that 
the meaning of a question can be represented  by the set of its (true) answers. (20a-b) 
are two simple examples, using Montague's  IL. 
(20) a.  Who ate the cake?  > Ap[Vp  A 3x[p  =  ^ate'(the  cake')(x)]] 
b.  How does John play chess? A' 
Xp[-p A 39[p  = ^a(play  chess')(j)]](29  is a variable  over adverb  meanings) 
As is evident from (20b), the semantics of how-questions  does appear  to involve quan- 
tification  over adverbs, which is ruled  out in IL*. However, the overwhelming  majority 
of adverbs  have predicative  counterparts-that is, they are morphosyntactically  derived 
from predicates. Therefore, both our syntax and our semantics must include some way 
of mapping  predicates into adverbs. For manner  adverbials,  we must therefore  assume, 
in our semantics, the existence of a function  (call it ly') that maps predicates  into predi- 
cate modifiers, roughly as follows: 
(21)  ly'(P)(Q)(x) = X Qs in a P manner 
(for example: ly'(slow')(run')(j)  = j runs in a slow manner) 
13 See Williams  (1977)  and  Sag (1976).  A discussion  of those approaches  within  a Montague-like  framework 
can be found in Rooth (1982), where the interpretation  of VP deletion is explicitly handled  as X-abstraction 
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Given this independently  needed adverb-forming  functor  ly', we can formulate  the mean- 
ing of (20b)  in IL* in a way that does not require  quantifying  over adverb  type meanings, 
namely: 
(22)  Ap[p A 3P[p  =  ^Iy'(P)(play  chess')(j)]] 
(where P ranges, as usual, over properties) 
The same line can be pursued  for any wh-phenomenon  involving  adverbs.14  On the face 
of it this move might seem quite strange.  In a theory like Montague's  (or in a first-order 
property  theory) it would not be needed, since anything  can be quantified  over in such 
a theory. Yet the proposal  just sketched makes the following  clear-cut  prediction,  which 
a Montague-like  theory  does  not make. There are adverbs (like too,  again,  also,  even, 
almost) that do not have predicative  counterparts.  Hence, we cannot adopt  the solution 
sketched above for manner  adverbials,  even though  both kinds of adverbs  may be con- 
strued as functions of the same semantic  type. It follows that adverbs  that lack a predi- 
cative counterpart  cannot be wh-moved or, for that matter, enter any anaphoric  rela- 
tionship. This appears  to be correct. 
Thus, the Functor Anaphora  Constraint  (as built into IL*) predicts the inability  of 
prepositions, determiners, and the like to enter anaphoric  relationships  (analogous to 
Wh  Movement or VP Deletion) and furthermore  predicts which adverbs can enter such 
relationships.  In a theory where every conceivable logical type (or, in fact, no conceiv- 
able logical type) exists as such, it is possible to quantify  over everything  and thus, as 
far as semantics goes, such a theory cannot make these predictions. 
The preceding  considerations  are at present largely speculative. However, the pre- 
liminary  evidence that we have discussed does seem to support  them. And even if sub- 
sequent research shows the need to qualify or weaken them in various ways, it should 
still be evident that the line taken here is worth pursuing. 
The claims considered in this section depend solely on adopting  IL* as a semantic 
framework  for natural  languages. They follow from the intrinsic  limitations  and char- 
acteristics of IL*, and no particular  view of the syntax-semantics  mapping  is necessary 
to obtain them. 
Specifically, let us see how some of the results achieved above can be obtained  by 
conjoining aspects of the semantics adopted here with assumptions  developed within 
theories of syntax different  from the one described in section 2.2. For instance, effects 
of the Functor  Anaphora  Constraint  could be derived  in the Government-Binding  frame- 
work along the following lines.15  Suppose we adopt the view defended here that there 
14 This also includes  clausal  adverbials,  such as for instance  why-questions.  The latter  could be analyzed 
as follows, 
(i)  Why does John smoke? 
kp[VpA3q[p  =  ^because'(q)(smoke')(j)]] 
where  p and q are propositional  variables  and because' is of type (p, ((e,p), (e,p))). 
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is some fundamental  semantic difference between predicates (propositional  functions) 
and adverbs (functions  from predicates  into predicates).  Suppose, furthermore,  that we 
adopt the view that proper  government  is lexical government,  along the lines developed 
in (for  example)  Stowell (1981).  In the present  terms,  we would  say that  a trace  is properly 
governed  iff it is the argument  of some propositional  function. Then it follows that there 
cannot be any functor anaphora.  For adverbials  are not lexically governed and hence 
(under,  say, Wh  Movement)  could not be properly  governed.  Cases of apparent  violations 
of this restriction  could be blamed on the (exceptional)  governing  character  of certain 
morphemes, such as -ly. 
4.  On the Distribution  of Predicative  Expressions 
The proposed theory, coupled with a compositional  interpretive  procedure,  has further 
consequences. Generally  speaking,  on this view properties  have two forms or modes of 
being: propositional  functions and individual  correlates  of propositional  functions. The 
former  are what their name suggests: functions. The latter  are nonfunctions.  Hence, we 
ought  to expect on the one hand  syntactic  patterns  where  predicative  expressions  display 
a behavior  typical  of functions  and  on the other  hand  syntactic  patterns  where  predicative 
expressions display a behavior  typical of arguments.  If properties  had only one form or 
mode of being, as other theories claim, there would be no reason to expect precisely 
this systematic duality. 
Let us now look at the facts. First we will consider  cases involving  predicate  nomi- 
nals, then cases involving verbs. 
4.1.  NPs vs. Predicate Nominals: The Case of Mass Nouns 
In a language  like English  a conspicuous  cluster  of distributional  properties  differentiates 
phrases like those in (23a) from phrases like those in (23b). 
(23) a.  Pavarotti, she, this, every student, a lousy tenor 
b.  student, lousy tenor, cabin with a red roof 
Distributional  clusterings such as those in (23) are precisely what syntactic categories 
are designed to capture. In the particular  case at hand, the pattern  in (23) is presumably 
best handled  by saying that the phrases in (23a) and those in (23b)  belong to related  but 
distinct syntactic categories. Within a categorial setting, the phrases in (23a) could be 
analyzed as NPs (Montague's  term-phrases)  and those in (23b)  as CNPs (common  noun 
phrases).'6 CNPs combine with determiners  to yield NPs. Now in a framework  where 
syntax and semantics go hand in hand, differences in syntactic categories are usually 
expected to correlate with differences in semantic type. This expectation seems to be 
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warranted  in the present case. Consider  the following examples: 
(24) a.  Every man  jogs. 
b.  Vx[man'(x)  __ jog'(x)]'7 
c.  John and Bill are students. 
d.  student (j) A student (b) 
e.  I want Fritz president. 
f.  want'(president'(f))(I) 
(24b,d,f) provide a plausible  representation  of the truth-conditional  import  of (24a,c,e), 
respectively. Note that although  there might be some doubt about the exact syntactic 
category  of what occurs in postcopular  position  in (24c)  and in the complement  structure 
of want in (24e), the syntactic category of what follows the determiner  in (24a) is un- 
controversial.  Be that as it may, the point is that in (24b,d,f) the CNs show up system- 
atically in predicate position. That is, the contribution  that the CNs seem to make to 
the truth conditions of these sentences is most straightforwardly  accommodated  by as- 
suming  that CNs are semantically  propositional  functions  of some sort. If CNs are propo- 
sitional functions, their semantic type must in our terms be (e, p). And if the type of 
CNPs is (e, p), then, by Functional  Correspondence,  the category  CNP must  be analyzed 
as a functional  category of some sort, say S/NP (while VP would be defined as S/NP). 
[-VI  [+V] 
Considerations  of this sort lead us to establish the existence of two related nominal 
categories: NP (associated with semantic type e and hence nonfunctional)  and CNP 
(associated with semantic type (e, p) and hence functional).'8  Indeed, we are merely 
recasting in our terms the analysis most generally adopted within Montague-oriented 
approaches. 
Now, where do mass nouns fall with respect to the CNP-NP contrast?  The answer 
seems to be: in both categories. Consider  the following examples: 
(25) a.  John found some gold yesterday. 
b.  This stuff is gold. 
c.  This ring is gold. 
d.  White gold is gold. 
(26) a.  John loves gold. 
b.  Gold is rare. 
c.  Fake gold is common. 
The mass expression gold behaves like a CNP in (25), and like an NP in (26). It is 
reasonable in cases like this to enter the relevant items in one of the two categories, 
and then have a category-switching  rule  that maps  them  into the other. Since NP-forming 
rules that take CNP inputs are needed in any event, we might assume that basic mass 
expressions belong to the lexical category  of common  nouns and later are turned  by rule 
into NPs. Now, as independently  established, the types of CNPs and NPs are propo- 
17 Adopting  restricted  quantification  would not affect the point being made. 
18 A different  line is adopted  in Chierchia  (1984),  but the relevant  point is the same on both approaches. FORMAL  SEMANTICS  AND  THE  GRAMMAR  OF  PREDICATION  435 
sitional  functions  and individuals,  respectively (recall  that  we are disregarding  quantified 
NPs from consideration).  Thus, the relevant  category-switching  rule must  be interpreted 
in terms of a semantic rule that maps propositional  functions into individuals.  It is an 
immediate  consequence of the syntax-semantics  homomorphism  that if the output of a 
certain syntactic rule belongs to a category A, its meaning must be of the type that 
corresponds  to A. Thus, although  mass CNPs semantically  are propositional  functions, 
for each such propositional  function there must be a corresponding  individual  that acts 
as the semantic value of the corresponding  mass NP. 
This is a necessary consequence of our semantics  that turns  out to make  good sense 
of the pattern  in (25) and (26). (25) shows that as propositional  functions, mass expres- 
sions can be true of various sorts of subjects:  stuff (25b),  ordinary  things  (25c), and  kinds 
of things (25d). The individual  correlates of such propositional  functions (i.e. the indi- 
viduals that mass NPs purport  to refer  to) can be thought  of as kinds or substances, with 
the warning  that they may, but need not, be natural  kinds (cf. (26c)). For instance, (26a) 
says that the love-relation  holds between John  and a certain  kind;  (26b)  says of the gold- 
kind that it is rare;  and so on. This seems to be simple  and intuitive, and it can be made 
very precise (cf. Pelletier and Schubert  (1984)). 
Now, according  to the analysis  just sketched, mass predicates must have an indi- 
vidual correlate  (to be regarded  as a kind, I suggest). But this is exactly how our theory 
claims that properties in general behave. If a systematic correlation  between proposi- 
tional functions and individuals  were not already built into our semantics, we would 
have to construct it ad hoc, for the case under consideration.  This is in fact precisely 
what the most articulated  recent proposal on this topic does (Pelletier and Schubert 
(1984)). 1 submit that the mechanism  that Pelletier and Schubert  develop to deal with 
mass expressions is a particular  case of (and can be derived in terms of)  a general 
semantics for predication. 
Moreover, I believe that the pattern mass nouns display is typical of the nominal 
system in its entirety (including,  that is, count nouns). The work on bare plural  NPs by 
Carlson (1977)  and others calls for just the same kind of Fregean  analysis of properties 
(see Chierchia  (1982; 1984)  for discussion). 
Thus, in the case of mass nominals, the two modes of being that a Fregean  theory 
posits for properties are actually syntacticized as two different  categories (i.e. as two 
distinct clusters of distributional  characteristics).  Categorial  structure  is no less "real" 
than, say, overt morphemes. Languages  use both to convey information.  And if prop- 
erties did not have two modes of being, why should natural  languages  realize them so 
often as two distinct syntactic categories? 
It is particularly  interesting  that the semantic  makeup  of the relevant  categories  can 
be established independently  of the behavior  of mass nouns. Consequently,  our general 
view of the syntax-semantics  mapping  leaves no choice but  to posit a correlation  between 
propositional  functions and individuals. Therefore, such a correlation  turns out to be 
both necessary and sufficient  to ex'plain  why mass expressions have the characteristics 
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4.2.  The Distribution  of Inflection in VPs and the Notion of "Finiteness" 
Certain  English verbs, like believe and know, take as their complement  (subcategorize 
for) an S' whose main verb is inflected (a finite S'). Other  verbs, like want and prefer, 
subcategorize  for an S' whose main  verb  lacks inflection  (for-to clauses, usually  analyzed 
as nonfinite clausal structures). But verbs that take VP as complement subcategorize 
only for uninflected  VPs. In other words, there are no constructions  like (27a-b): 
(27) a.  *John  tries leaves. 
b.  *John  forces Mary leaves. 
These well-known observations  can be summarized  as follows: 
(28)  S'  S'  *VP  VP 
[ + infl]  [-  infl]  [+ infl]  [-  infl] 
Interestingly,  this paradigm  is by no means restricted  to English. Something  analogous 
shows up in many languages  (although  nonfiniteness  in VPs need not always be marked 
by [-  infl]). 
To my knowledge, no fully satisfactory  account of the gap in (28) is currently  avail- 
able. Base-generated  approaches stipulate its existence by means of some feature co- 
occurrence  restriction  (see for example  Gazdar,  Pullum,  and Sag (1981),  Bresnan  (1982)). 
Within  the GB framework  it is usually stipulated  that although  [ + infl] (regarded  as an 
abstract node, daughter  of S) governs and assigns case to the subject position, [-  infl] 
does not. Furthermore,  PRO (the null subject of infinitives)  is stipulated  to be able to 
occur only in caseless positions (Chomsky (1981, 190ff.)). Though these stipulations 
might arguably  account for more than the distribution  of PRO (but see Bresnan (1982) 
for strong arguments  to the contrary), still we might wonder whether they could be 
altogether eliminated, or reduced to something  more general. I submit that the theory 
of predication  developed thus far can do precisely that. 
Suppose we stipulate  that finite (i.e. [ +finite]) VPs are propositional  functions, and 
that nonfinite  (i.e. [-finite])  VPs are their individual  correlates.  Suppose in other words 
that  the feature  [ - finite]  (which  in English  happens  to be realized  as the lack of inflection) 
is the syntacticization  of the Fregean embedding  of our semantics, as far as the verbal 
system is concerned.  Then  paradigm  (28)  falls into  place. Try,  wish, etc., are  propositional 
functions, that is, by definition, functions from individuals  into propositions. As such, 
they cannot apply to other propositional  functions  but only to their  individual  correlates. 
The feature [ - finite] maps  propositional  functions  (such as the semantic  values of kisses 
Mary) into their correlates (i.e. to kiss Mary), which can be thought of as actions or 
states.'9 Hence, VP-taking  verbs can only take nonfinite  complements.  Finite VPs, being 
'9 For this account to work properly,  something  will have to guarantee  that although  [-finite]  is mor- 
phologically  realized  on the verb, its semantic  scope must  be the whole  VP. We want  to nominalize  the complex 
property  kiss'(m)  (i.e. to kiss Mary), not just the relation  kiss'. The problems  that these asymmetries  pose in 
morphology  are fairly  well known  (think  of tense, for example),  and various  proposals  have been made about 
how to handle them. For a discussion of the problems  involved in a categorial  framework,  see for example 
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propositional  functions, are of the wrong logical type to be arguments  of other propo- 
sitional functions. Conversely, the unacceptability  of,  say,  *John to leave would be 
accounted for by the fact that to leave is not a function and hence cannot be saturated 
by an argument.  These considerations  can be summed  up as follows: 
(29) a.  John leaves. 
b.  leave'(j) 
c.  *John  to leave. 
d.  [leave'](j) 
e.  John tries to leave. 
f.  try'(^leave')(j) 
g.  *John  tries leaves. 
h.  try'(leave')(j) 
(29b,d,f,h) would be the semantics associated with (29a,c,e,g), respectively. (29d) is 
semantically  incoherent  because 'leave' is a name of an individual  (say, something  like 
an action) and individuals  do not take arguments.  (29f) is all right  since try  is semantically 
a relation  (2-place  propositional  function)  between individuals  and actions. (29g)  is ruled 
out, because leave', being a propositional  function and not an individual,  is simply not 
in the domain of try'. 
This account has many appealing  features. The semantics proposed here includes 
a universal distinction between propositional  functions and their individual  correlates, 
and we expect it to be realized  in the syntax. By assuming  that it is realized  in the verbal 
system as the [+ finite] contrast, we account simply for the pervasive paradigm  (28). 
Case theory can then be simplified  essentially to the statement  "Propositional  functions 
assign case.-20  There is no need to stipulate  that [ + infl] assigns case and [ - infl] does 
not. That [-  infl] is a non-case-assigner  can be attributed  to its meaning,  that is, to the 
fact that [-infl]  is semantically a mapping  from functions into individuals  (and only 
functions can assign case). This enables us to reduce a stipulation  on the case-assigning 
properties  of [ ? infl] to a stipulation  about its meaning.  This is a step forward,  since the 
new stipulation  clearly covers more territory.  For one thing, it allows us to account for 
paradigm (28) in terms of  a mechanism that automatically  takes care of the truth- 
conditional import of the constructions in question. Furthermore,  such a mechanism 
(our theory of predication)  handles a number  of seemingly unrelated  patterns, such as 
the behavior of predicate nominals, the Three-Layers Hypothesis, and the Functor 
Anaphora  Constraint. 
I am assuming  here that there are (at least) two sorts of propositional  functions.  Propositional  functions 
that  are the semantic  values of common  nouns  have kinds  as their  individual  correlates.  Propositional  functions 
that are the semantic  values of VPs are instead  correlated  with something  like states or actions. The copula 
be would then be interpreted  semantically  as a function  that  maps  propositional  functions  of the first sort (e.g. 
gold, men) into propositional  functions  of the second sort (e.g. be gold, be men). This hinges upon the issue 
of the semantic  difference  between common  nouns and VPs, an issue that is still open and cannot  be properly 
addressed  here. 
20  For relevant  discussion, see for example  Keenan  and Faltz (1978),  Bach (1983),  Chierchia  (1984,  chap. 
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Thus, at the very least the stipulation  on the meaning  of [  infl] (or, more generally, 
[  finite]) relates pattern  (28) in an interesting  way to a range  of data broader  than what 
other conceivable stipulations  can cover. 
However, I believe that the syntactic framework  developed in section 2.2 enables 
us to dispense with the stipulation  on the meaning  of [ ? infl] altogether.  That is, it can 
be derived  from  other  properties  of the system. Consider  the categorial  analysis  of simple 
subject-predicate  sentences according  to the system developed in section 2.2: 
(30) a.  John runs, S 
John, NP  runs, S/NP 
b.  run'  (j) 
If anything  is a VP, runs is. By the independently  motivated  categorial  base for English 
presented  in section 2.2, VP = S/NP. Hence, by our general  syntax-semantics  mapping, 
runs must be semantically  associated with a propositional  function. This eliminates  the 
need for stipulating  that finite VPs are semantically  propositional  functions. Now, we 
adopt the view that infinitives are syntactically  VPs. Again, such a view has been mo- 
tivated on the basis of facts completely independent  of paradigm  (28). In fact, that para- 
digm has often been presented as a problem  for the VP analysis of infinitives (see for 
example Koster and May (1982)). In the categorial setting, from the VP analysis of 
infinitives, it follows that infinitival-taking  verbs must be analyzed as VP/VP (rather 
than VP//VP), since they share all the distributional  and morphological  properties of 
verbs rather  than those of modifiers.  On the basis of the category-type  mapping,  an item 
of category VP/VP must be of the semantic type of 2-place propositional  functions. 
Hence, an item of category VP/VP cannot take an inflected VP as argument,  for the 
latter  are propositional  functions. If something  of category  VP/VP  were to combine  with 
an inflected VP, the relevant rule (i.e. Categorial  Cancellation/Functional  Application) 
could not be used, and some other marked  mechanism  would have to be invoked. Thus, 
the VPs that VP-taking  verbs combine with must be logically  individuals,  and we would 
expect there to be something  (a morpheme,  a particle, a categorial  marking)  that maps 
propositional  functions into their individual  correlates. For suppose there were a lan- 
guage where no morphological  marking  distinguished  VPs occurring  in matrix  sentences 
from VPs occurring  in argument  position. That is, suppose there were a language  just 
like English that did systematically  display paradigms  like the following: 
(31) a.  John leaves. 
b.  John tries leaves. 
c.  John forces Mary leaves. 
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function with leaves. But this would be ranked  very poorly by the evaluation  metric  (the 
Well-formedness  Constraint)  and hence a language  with the properties  in (31) should  not 
be easily found, which seems to be correct. It should be emphasized  that the [-  finite] 
morpheme  in English is not a null element in the same sense as the abstract  morpheme 
that would have to be postulated  for (31). The point is simply  that the [ + finite]/[  - finite] 
contrast in English is signaled by an overt morphological  alternation  (the presence or 
absence of inflection). Thus, the stipulation  that [  -  infl] is the syntacticization  of the 
Fregean embedding  can also be seen to follow from independent  characteristics  of the 
framework  adopted here. 
The present approach  has other empirical  consequences: 
(i) We have already seen that an infinitival  VP is a nominalized  property and as 
such cannot be saturated  by a subject;  this predicts  the inability  of NP to VP sequences 
to form clausal structures. The rule for combining  VPs with NPs must be Categorial 
Cancellation/Functional  Application.  But in NP to VP structures  there is no function to 
be applied; hence, the standard  rule would block. This also implies that whenever NP 
to VP sequences are found in the complement  structure  of some verb, they cannot form 
a constituent. In other words, structures  of the following  form  are not expected to exist: 
(32)  VP 
V  X 
NP  VP 
[ -  infl] 
Compositionality  requires that X in (32) be a well-formed  semantic unit and that it be 
obtained by Functional Application. But since uninflected  VPs are not functions, this 
requirement  cannot be satisfied. To illustrate: 
(33) a.  John forces (persuades, etc.) Mary to leave. 
b.  John expects (believes, etc.) Mary to leave. 
In (33) NP to VP sequences occur in the argument  structure  of a higher  verb. Given the 
meaning  of [ - infl], such sequences cannot semantically  form  a unit. Hence, they cannot 
be constituents. For one of the consequences of compositionality,  as defined here, is 
that  in general  things  that  are not semantic  units  cannot  be syntactic  units. This  prediction 
can be tested, and indeed, Passive, Clefting, and Right Node Raising all converge in 
showing  that the relevant  structures  in (33)  do not form  a constituent  (see Bresnan  (1982) 
for detailed discussion). What is of interest here is that we are led to make detailed 
predictions about the constituent structure  of certain constructions on the basis of a 
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(ii) Infinitival  VPs must be semantically  associated with individuals  (activities and 
the like). Individuals  cannot be directly saturated  by arguments.  However, infinitives 
denote a special sort  of individual,  namely  properties  that  have lost their  unsaturatedness, 
as it were. Hence, it is conceivable for entities of this special sort to be indirectly  related 
to arguments  via, say, some higher  function. Such a function  should somehow give back 
to infinitives  the unsaturatedness  that they have lost. In other words, structures  like (34) 
should exist: 
(34)  [x at NP  VP] 
t-  infl] 
The infinitival  VP cannot directly relate to the NP, being a nominalized  propositional 
function. However, it has the potential  for doing so, being a nominalized  propositional 
function. Thus, there can be items, such as a in (34), that take the NP and the infinitival 
VP as arguments  and "mesh" them. For that to be possible, a would simply have to 
have the meaning  of a predication  operator, something  that says "Recover the propo- 
sitional function associated with this individual  and apply it to that individual."21  Of 
course, given the Well-formedness  Constraint,  we would expect such a predication  op- 
erator to be realized, in general, as some overt functor. 
Again, at least for English, these expectations  appear  to be warranted.  The relevant 
structures  are  for-to clauses. In  for NP to VP structures,  NP clearly acts as the subject 
of the VP. But, as just argued,  this is possible only if there is some overt predicator  that 
"denominalizes"  the infinitival  VP. Thus, thefor in  for-to clauses must play exactly the 
role of a in (34). That is, its semantics  -must  be roughly  as follows: 
(35)  for'(NP')(VP') =  VP'(NP') 
For is a functor  that takes two arguments  and yields a proposition.  Given this semantics, 
it follows that  for-to clauses must be syntactically  constituents, since for and its argu- 
ments form a semantic  unit. Thus, if an NP -  VP occurs within the argument  structure 
[-infi] 
of a verb that does not subcategorize  for, it cannot  form  a constituent;  if such a structure 
occurs within the argument  structure  of a verb that does subcategorizefor, it must form 
a constituent. These predictions  appear  to be borne out. 
To summarize:  Nonfinite VPs can be related to a "subject" only indirectly, either 
via entailments associated with some higher verb or via a predication  marker.  This is 
bound to condition  what the constituent  structure  of these constructions  can be (subject 
to various language-particular  parameters).  In cases where the NP -  VP constructions 
[-  infl] 
appear  to be directly connected without the mediation  of an overt predication  marker, 
we would be forced to postulate a null predication  marker  of some sort, a costly (i.e. 
marked)  option. 
Thus, the central generalizations  concerning  the distribution  of [?  +infl] (the finite- 
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nonfinite contrast) in English can be deduced from an abstract and very general hy- 
pothesis about the semantics of predication  and the assumption  that [ - infl] (nonfinite- 
ness) is the syntactic manifestation  of the Fregean  embedding  function  within  the verbal 
system. This assumption is quite simple, even if it were to be stipulated. Presumably, 
if one were to embed the present  theory of properties  within  a different  theory  of syntax, 
such a stipulation would be necessary. It is not needed, however, in the framework 
adopted here, where the nonfiniteness-Fregean  embedding  correlation  can be derived 
from general properties  of the grammar  (such as the category-type  mapping,  composi- 
tionality, and the inability  of propositional  functions to be arguments). 
5.  Conclusions 
If semantics exists, it must say something  about the meaning  of predicative  expressions 
(properties)  and their nexus to subjects (predication).  Various general considerations 
strongly suggest that properties can in some sense be predicated  of themselves (pace 
type theory). A Fregean approach  allows for this by distinguishing  two systematically 
interconnected  modes of being  for properties:  as propositional  functions  and  as individual 
images of propositional  functions. First-order  theories of properties  grant  them only the 
latter status, namely as individuals  (see for example Bealer (1982, 85ff.)). If the Fregean 
approach  is correct, one would expect the fundamental  semantic  contrast  between propo- 
sitional functions and individual  correlates to play an identifiable  role in the behavior 
of predicative  expressions, that is, to manifest  itself in a number  of syntactic patterns. 
I have argued  that this is indeed what happens.  Within  the English  nominal  system, 
the behavior of mass nouns shows that the Fregean contrast  can be encoded as a cate- 
gorial one (NP vs.  CNP). Within the verbal system, it can be encoded in whatever 
instantiates  the finite vs. nonfinite contrast ([+ infl] in English). This sets up a pool of 
parameters  for the realization  of the relevant semantic distinction  that might be nearly 
exhaustive. However, I shall not pursue this here. 
Four points are worth emphasizing. First, the hypotheses on the encoding of the 
nominalizing  function are not stipulations,  but the point of convergence of several in- 
dependent considerations. Second, such hypotheses allow us to deduce fairly complex 
and differentiated  patterns  of predicative  constructions  from a few formal  properties  of 
the grammar.  Third, the proposed theory of predication  also claims that a number  of 
classificatory principles for semantic domains are built into Universal Grammar,  prin- 
ciples that have been seen to make certain interesting  predictions (the Three-Layers 
Hypothesis, the functor-property  asymmetries). Fourth, this theory not only accom- 
modates what can be observed, but also rules out various a priori conceivable gram- 
matical processes. By limiting the possible semantic processes, it also severely limits 
the possible syntactic processes. 
Various aspects of my proposals might of course be falsified by future  research. It 
might  be, for instance, that the compositional  implementation  of the proposed  theory of 
properties  will have to be substantially  modified,  although  I have argued  that  the opposite 442  GENNARO  CHIERCHIA 
is the case. Be that as it may, the considerations  I have presented  would still constitute 
evidence that logical (model-theoretic)  semantics  is not simply  a way of spelling  out truth 
conditions, possibly convenient but low in explanatory  potential. On the contrary, its 
principled  implementation  in Universal Grammar  is a valuable contribution  to the in- 
vestigation of the notion "possible human  language." 
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